We give exponential lower bounds on the Price of Stability (PoS) of weighted congestion games with polynomial cost functions. In particular, for any positive integer d we construct rather simple games with cost functions of degree at most d which have a PoS of at least \Omega (\Phi d ) d+1 , where \Phi d \sim d/ ln d is the unique positive root of the equation x d+1 = (x + 1) d . This almost closes the huge gap between \Theta (d) and \Phi d+1 d . Our bound extends also to network congestion games. We further show that the PoS remains exponential even for singleton games. More generally, we provide a lower bound of \Omega ((1 + 1/\alpha ) d /d) on the PoS of \alpha -approximate Nash equilibria for singleton games. All our lower bounds hold for mixed and correlated equilibria as well. On the positive side, we give a general upper bound on the PoS of \alpha -approximate Nash equilibria, which is sensitive to the range W of the player weights and the approximation parameter \alpha . We do this by explicitly constructing a novel approximate potential function, based on Faulhaber's formula, that generalizes Rosenthal's potential in a continuous, analytic way. From the general theorem, we deduce two interesting corollaries. First, we derive the existence of an approximate pure Nash equilibrium with PoS at most (d + 3)/2; the equilibrium's approximation parameter ranges from \Theta (1) to d + 1 in a smooth way with respect to W . Second, we show that for unweighted congestion games, the PoS of \alpha -approximate Nash equilibria is at most (d + 1)/\alpha . ).
1. Introduction. In the last 20 years, a central strand of research within algorithmic game theory has focused on understanding and quantifying the inefficiency of equilibria compared to centralized, optimal solutions. There are two standard concepts that measure this inefficiency. The Price of Anarchy (PoA) [38] , which takes the worst-case perspective, compares the worst-case equilibrium with the system optimum. It is a very robust measure of performance. On the other hand, the Price of Stability (PoS) [51, 5] , which is also the focus of this work, takes an optimistic perspective and uses the best-case equilibrium for this comparison. The PoS is an appropriate concept for analyzing the ideal solution that we would like our protocols to produce.
The initial set of problems that arose from the PoA theory have now been resolved. The most rich and well-studied among these models are, arguably, the atomic and nonatomic variants of congestion games (see [44, Ch. 18 ] for a detailed discus-sion). This class of games is very descriptive and captures a large variety of scenarios where users compete for resources, most prominently routing games. The seminal work of Roughgarden and Tardos [49, 50] gave the answer for the nonatomic variant, where each player controls a negligible amount of traffic. Awerbuch, Azar, and Epstein [6] and Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [18] resolved the PoA for atomic congestion games with affine latencies, generalized by Aland et al. [3] to polynomials; this led to the development of Roughgarden's smoothness framework [48] , which extended the bounds to general cost functions, but also distilled and formulated previous ideas to bound the PoA in an elegant, unified framework. At the computational complexity front, we know that even for simple congestion games, finding a (pure) Nash equilibrium is a complete problem for the complexity class PLS (Polynomial Local Search) [24, 2] .
Allowing the players to have different loads gives rise to the class of weighted congestion games [47] ; this is a natural and very important generalization of congestion games, with numerous applications in routing and scheduling. Unfortunately though, an immediate dichotomy between weighted and unweighted congestion games occurs: the former may not even have pure Nash equilibria [41, 28, 30, 33] ; as a matter of fact, it is a strongly NP-hard problem to even determine if that is the case [23] . Moreover, in such games there does not, in general, exist a potential function [43, 34] , which is the main tool for proving equilibrium existence in the unweighted case.
As a result, a sharp contrast with respect to our understanding of the two aforementioned inefficiency notions arises. The PoA has been studied in depth, and general techniques for providing tight bounds are known. Moreover, the asymptotic behavior of weighted and unweighted congestion games with respect to the PoA is identical; it is \Theta (d/ log d) d for both classes when latencies are polynomials of degree at most d [3] .
The situation for the PoS, though, is completely different. For unweighted games we have a good understanding, 1 and the values are much lower than the PoA values, and also tight---approximately 1.577 for affine functions [19, 13] and \Theta (d) [17] for polynomials. For weighted games, though, there is a huge gap; the current stateof-the-art lower bound is \Theta (d), and the upper bound is \Theta (d/ ln d) d . These previous results are summarized at the left of Table 1 .1a.
The main focus of this work is precisely to deal with this lack of understanding and to determine the PoS of weighted congestion games. What makes this problem challenging is that the only general known technique for showing upper bounds for the PoS is the potential method, which is applicable only to potential games. In a nutshell, the idea of this method is to use the global minimizer of Rosenthal's potential [46] as an equilibrium refinement. This equilibrium is also a pure Nash equilibrium and can serve as an upper bound of the PoS. Interestingly, it turns out that, for several classes of potential games, this technique actually provides the tight answer (see, for example, [5, 19, 13, 17] ). However, as already mentioned above, unlike their Table 1 . 1 The PoA and PoS for unweighted and weighted congestion games, with polynomial latency functions of maximum degree d. \Phi d is the unique positive solution of (x + 1) d = x d+1 and \Phi d = \Theta (d/ log d). Tight answers were known for all settings, except for the PoS of the weighted case where only trivial bounds existed. In this paper we almost close this gap by showing a lower bound of \Omega (\Phi d ) d+1 (Theorem 3.1), which remains exponential even for singleton games (Theorem 3.5).
(a) Previous results
PoA PoS unweighted \lfloor \Phi d \rfloor d+1 [3] \Theta (d) [17] weighted \Phi d+1 d [3] [\Theta (d), \Phi unweighted counterparts, weighted congestion games are not potential games; 2 so, a completely fresh approach is required. One way to override the aforementioned limitations of nonexistence of pure Nash equilibria, but also their computational hardness, is to consider approximate equilibria. In this direction, Hansknecht, Klimm, and Skopalik [32] have shown that (d + 1)-approximate pure Nash equilibria always exist in weighted congestion games with polynomial latencies of maximum degree d, while, on the negative side, there exist games that do not have 1.153-approximate pure Nash equilibria. Notice here that these results do not take into account computational complexity considerations; if we insist on polynomial-time algorithms for actually finding those equilibria, then the currently best approximation parameter becomes d O(d) [14, 15, 26 ].
1.1. Our results. We provide lower and upper bounds on the PoS for the class of weighted congestion games with polynomial latencies with nonnegative coefficients. We consider both exact and approximate equilibria. Our lower bounds are summarized in Table 1 .1b.
Lower bound for weighted congestion games. In our main result in Theorem 3.1, we resolve a long-standing open problem by providing almost tight bounds for the PoS of weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions. We construct an instance having a PoS of \Omega (\Phi d ) d+1 , where d is the maximum degree of the latencies and \Phi d \sim d ln d is the unique positive solution of equation (x + 1) d = x d+1 . This bound almost closes the previously huge gap between \Theta (d) and \Phi d+1 d for the PoS of weighted congestion games. The previously best lower and upper bounds were rather trivial: the lower bound corresponds to the PoS results of Christodoulou and Gairing [17] for the unweighted case (and thus, it is also a valid lower bound for the general weighted case as well), and the upper bound comes from the PoA results of Aland et al. [3] (PoA, by definition, upper-bounds PoS). It is important to make clear here that our lower bound still leaves an open gap for future work: the constant within the base of \Omega (\Phi d ) in Theorem 3.1 produces a lower bound of ( 1 2 \Phi d ) d+1 , which is formally a factor of 2 d+1 away from the \Phi d+1 d PoA upper bound. Although, as mentioned before, weighted congestion games do not always possess pure equilibria, our lower bound construction involves a unique equilibrium occurring by iteratively eliminating strongly dominated strategies. As a result, this lower bound holds not only for pure but also for mixed and correlated equilibria.
Singleton games. Next we switch to the class of singleton congestion games, where a pure strategy for each player is a single resource. This class is very well studied as, on one hand, it abstracts scheduling environments, and, on the other, it has very attractive equilibrium properties; unlike general weighted congestion games, there exists an (ordinal) lexicographic potential [29, 35] , thus implying the existence of pure Nash equilibria. It is important to note that the tight lower bounds for the PoA of general weighted congestion games hold also for the class of singleton games [13, 8, 11] .
Even for this special class, we show in Theorem 3.5 an exponential lower bound of \Omega (2 d /d). The previous best lower and upper bounds were the same as those of the general case, namely \Theta (d) and \Phi d+1 d , respectively. As a matter of fact, this new lower bound comes as a corollary of a more general result that we show in Theorem 3.5 that extends to approximate equilibria and gives a lower bound of \Omega ((1 + 1/\alpha ) d /d) on the PoS of \alpha -approximate equilibria for any (multiplicative) approximation parameter \alpha \in [1, d) . Setting \alpha = 1, we recover the special case of exact equilibria and the aforementioned exponential lower bound on the standard, exact notion of the PoS. Notice here that, as we show in Theorem D.1, the optimal solution (which, in general, is not an equilibrium) itself constitutes a (d + 1)-approximate equilibrium with a (trivially) optimal PoS of 1.
Positive results for approximate equilibria. In light of the above results, in section 4, we turn our attention to identifying environments with more structure or flexibility with respect to the underlying solution concept, for which we can hope for improved quality of equilibria. Both our lower bound constructions discussed above use players' weights that form a geometric sequence. In particular, the ratio W of the largest over the smallest weight is equal to w n (for some w > 1), which grows very large as the number of players n \rightar \infty . On the other hand, for games where the players have equal weights, i.e., W = 1, we know that the PoS is at most d + 1. It is therefore natural to ask how the performance of the good equilibria captured by the notion of PoS varies with respect to W . In Theorem 4.4, we are able to give a general upper bound for \alpha -approximate equilibria which is sensitive to this parameter W and to \alpha . This general theorem has two immediate, interesting corollaries.
First (Corollary 4.5), by allowing the ratio W to range in [1, \infty ) , we derive the existence of an \alpha -approximate pure Nash equilibrium with PoS at most (d + 3)/2; the equilibrium's approximation parameter \alpha ranges from \Theta (1) to d + 1 in a smooth way with respect to W . This is of particular importance in settings where player weights are not very far away from each other (that is, W is small). Second (Corollary 4.6), by setting W = 1 and allowing \alpha to range up to d + 1, we get an upper bound of d+1 \alpha for the \alpha -approximate PoS of unweighted congestion games which, to the best of our knowledge, was not known before, degrading gracefully from d + 1 (which is the actual PoS of exact equilibria in the unweighted case [17] ) down to the optimal value of 1 if we allow (d + 1)-approximate equilibria (which in fact can be achieved by the optimum solution itself; see Theorem D.1).
Our techniques. An advantage of our main lower bound (Theorem 3.1) is the simplicity of the underlying construction as well as its straightforward adaptation to network games (see subsection 3.1.1)). However, fine-tuning the parameters of the game (player weights and latency functions), to ensure uniqueness of the equilibrium at the``bad"" instance, was a technically involved task. This was due in part to the fact that, in order to guarantee uniqueness (via iteratively dominant strategies), each player interacts with a window of \mu other players. This \mu depends on d in a delicate way (see Figure 3 .1 and Lemma 3.2); it has to be an integer but, at the same time, needs also to balance nicely with the algebraic properties of \Phi d .
Moreover, we needed to provide deeper insights into the asymptotic, analytic behavior of \Phi d and to explore some new algebraic characteristics of \Phi d (see, e.g., Lemma A.3). It is important to keep in mind that asymptotically \Phi d \sim d ln d (see (A.6)). The fact that \Phi d = \Theta \bigl( d ln d \bigr) was already known by the work of Aland et al. [3] ; here we provide a more refined characterization of \Phi d 's growth, using the Lambert-W function (see (A.7)).
In order to derive our upper bounds, we need to define a novel approximate potential function [16, 20, 32] . First, in Lemma 4.1, we identify clear algebraic sufficient conditions for the existence of approximate equilibria with good social-cost guarantees, and then we explicitly define (see (4.4) and (4.10) in the proof of Theorem 4.4) a function that satisfies them. This continuous function, which is defined in the entire space of positive reals, essentially generalizes that of Rosenthal in a smooth way: by setting W = \alpha = 1, we recover exactly the first significant terms of the well-known Rosenthal potential [46] polynomial, with which one can demonstrate the usual PoS results for the unweighted case (see, e.g., [19] ). The simple, analytic way in which this function is defined is the very reason we can handle both the approximation parameter \alpha of the equilibrium and the ratio W of the weights in a smooth manner while at the same time providing good PoS guarantees.
It is important to stress that, by the purely analytical way in which our approximate potential function is defined, in principle it can also incorporate more general cost functions than polynomials; so, we believe that this technique may be of independent interest. We point towards that direction in Appendix C.
Model and notation.
Let \BbbR denote the set of real numbers, \BbbR \geq 0 = [0, \infty ) and \BbbR >0 = (0, \infty ).
Weighted congestion games. A weighted congestion game consists of a finite, nonempty set of players N and resources (or facilities) E. Each player i \in N has a weight w i \in \BbbR >0 and a strategy set S i \subsete 2 E . Associated with each resource e \in E is a cost (or latency) function c e : \BbbR >0 -\rightar \BbbR \geq 0 . In this paper we mainly focus on polynomial cost functions with maximum degree d \geq 0 and nonnegative coefficients; that is, every cost function is of the form c e (x) = \sum d j=0 a e,j \cdot x j , with a e,j \geq 0 for all j. In the following, whenever we refer to polynomial cost functions we mean cost functions of this particular form.
A pure strategy profile is a choice of strategies s = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ) \in S = S 1 \times \cdot \cdot \cdot \times S n by the players. We use the standard game-theoretic notation s - i = (s 1 , . . . , s i - 1 , s i+1 , . . . , s n ), S - i = S 1 \times \cdot \cdot \cdot \times S i - 1 \times S i+1 \times \cdot \cdot \cdot \times S n , such that s = (s i , s - i ). Given a pure strategy profile s, we define the load x e (s) of resource e \in E as the total weight of players that use resource e on s, i.e., x e (s) = \sum i\in N :e\in si w i . The cost player i is defined by C i (s) = \sum e\in si c e (x e (s)). A singleton weighted congestion game is a special form of congestion game where the strategies of all players consist only of single resources; that is, for all players i \in N , | s i | = 1 for all s i \in S i . In a weighted network congestion game the resources E are given as the edge set of some directed graph G = (V, E), and each player i \in N has a source o i \in V and destination t i \in V node; then, the strategy set S i of each player is implicitly given as the edge sets of all directed o i \rightar t i paths in G.
Nash equilibria. A pure strategy profile s is a pure Nash equilibrium if and only if for every player i \in N and for all s \prime i \in S i , we have C i (s) \leq C i (s \prime i , s - i ). Similarly a strategy profile is an \alpha -approximate pure Nash equilibrium, for \alpha \geq 1, if C i (s) \leq \alpha \cdot C i (s \prime i , s - i ) for all players i \in N and s \prime i \in S i . As discussed in the introduction, weighted congestion games do not always admit pure Nash equilibria. However, by Nash's theorem they have mixed Nash equilibria. A tuple \sigma = (\sigma 1 , . . . , \sigma N ) of independent probability distributions over players' strategy sets is a mixed Nash equilibrium if \BbbE \bfs \sim \sigma
holds for every i \in N and s \prime i \in S i . Here \sigma - i is a product distribution of all \sigma j 's with j \not = i, and s - i denotes a strategy profile drawn from this distribution. We use NE(G) to denote the set of all mixed Nash equilibria of a game G.
Social cost and price of stability. Fix a weighted congestion game G. The social cost of a pure strategy profile s is the weighted sum of the players' costs
x e (s) \cdot c e (x e (s)).
Denote by OPT(G) = min \bfs \in S C(s) the optimum social cost over all strategy profiles s \in S. Then, the Price of Stability (PoS) of G is the social cost of the best-case Nash equilibrium over the optimum social cost:
The PoS of \alpha -approximate Nash equilibria is defined accordingly. The PoS for a class \scrG of games is the worst (i.e., largest) PoS among all games in the class, that is, PoS(\scrG ) = sup G\in \scrG PoS(G). For example, our focus in this paper is determining the PoS for the class \scrG of weighted congestion games with polynomial cost functions. For brevity, we will sometimes abuse our formal terminology and refer to the``PoS of s"" for a specific (approximate) equilibrium s of a game G (see, e.g., Theorem 4.4); by that we will mean the approximation ratio of the social cost of s to the optimum, i.e., C(\bfs )
OPT(G) . Clearly, the PoS of any such equilibrium s is a valid upper bound to the PoS of the entire game G.
Finally, notice that, by using a straightforward scaling argument, it is without loss with respect to the PoS metric to analyze games with player weights in [1, \infty ) ; if not, divide all w i 's with min i w i and scale cost functions accordingly.
Lower bounds.
In this section, we present our lower bound constructions. In subsection 3.1 we present the general lower bound and then in subsection 3.2 the lower bound for singleton games.
3.1. General congestion games. The next theorem presents our main negative result on the PoS of weighted congestion games with polynomial latencies of degree d that almost matches the PoA upper bound of \Phi d+1 d from Aland et al. [3] . Our result shows a strong separation for the PoS between weighted and unweighted congestion games; the PoS of the latter is at most d + 1 [17] . This is in sharp contrast to the PoA of these two classes, where the respective bounds are essentially the same.
To state our result, we first introduce some notation. Let \Phi d \sim d ln d be the unique positive root of the equation (x+1) d = x d+1 , and let \beta d be a parameter with \beta d \geq 0.38 for any d, lim d\rightar\infty \beta d = 1 2 (formally, \beta d is defined in (3.2) below, and a plot of its values can be seen in Figure 3 Theorem 3.1. The Price of Stability of weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions of degree at most d \geq 9 is at least (\beta d \Phi d ) d+1 .
We must mention here that the restriction of d \geq 9 is without loss: for polynomial latencies of smaller degrees d \leq 8 we can instead apply the simpler lower-bound instance for singleton games given in subsection 3.2. To prove the theorem, we will need the following technical lemma. Its proof can be found in Appendix A.2. 
Then
and for all d \geq 9, Plots of parameters c d and \beta d can be found in Figure 3 .1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Fix some integer d \geq 9. Our lower bound instance consists of n + \mu players and n + \mu + 1 facilities, where \mu :=c \cdot d for c = c d defined as in (3.1). In particular then, due to (3.4) of Lemma 3.2, \mu \geq 3 is an integer. You can think of n as a very large integer, since at the end we will take n \rightar \infty . Every player i = 1, 2, . . . , n + \mu has a weight of w i = w i , where w = 1 + 1 \Phi d . We must mention here that the restriction of d \geq 9 is without loss: for polynomial latencies of smaller degrees d \leq 8 we can instead apply the simpler lower bound instance for singleton games given in subsection 3.2. To prove the theorem, we will need the following technical lemma. Its proof can be found in Appendix A.2. 
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Proof of Theorem 3.1. Fix some integer d \geq 9. Our lower bound instance consists of n + \mu players and n + \mu + 1 facilities, where \mu :=c \cdot d for c = c d defined as in (3.1). In particular then, due to (3.4) of Lemma 3.2, \mu \geq 3 is an integer. We can think of n as a very large integer, since at the end we will take n \rightar \infty . Every player i = 1, 2, . . . , n + \mu has a weight of w i = w i , where w = 1 + 1 \Phi d .
It will be useful for subsequent computations to notice that
Let us also define
where \beta = \beta d is defined as in (3.2) . In the following we will make extensive use of the observation that
The facilities have latency functions
Every player i has two available strategies, s \ast i and \s i . Eventually we will show that the profile s \ast corresponds to the optimal solution, while \s corresponds to the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. Informally, at the former the player chooses to stay at her``own"" ith facility, while at the latter she chooses to deviate and play the \mu following facilities i + 1, . . . , i + \mu . However, special care shall be taken for the boundary cases of the first \mu and last \mu players, so for any player i we formally define
These two outcomes, s \ast and \s, are shown in Figure 3 .2.
Notice here that any facility j cannot get a load greater than the sum of the weights of the previous \mu players plus the weight of the jth player. So, for any strategy profile s,
Next we will show that the strategy profile \s = (\s 1 , . . . , \s n+\mu ) is the unique Nash equilibrium of our congestion game. We do that by proving the following: 1. It is a strongly dominant strategy for any player i = 1, . . . , \mu to play \s i . 2. For any i = \mu + 1, . . . , n + \mu , given that every player k < i has chosen to play \s k , then it is a strongly dominant strategy for player i to deviate to \s i as well. For the first condition, fix some player i \leq \mu and a strategy profile s - i for the other players and observe that by choosing \s i , player i incurs a cost of at most
, where in the first inequality we used the bound from (3.5) .
For the second condition, we will consider the deviations of the remaining players. Fix now some i = \mu + 1, . . . , n and assume a strategy profile s - i = (\s 1 , . . . , \s i - 1 , s i+1 , . . . , s n+\mu ) for the remaining players 3 . If player i chooses strategy s \ast i she will experience a cost of
It remains to show that
The social optimum s \ast and the unique Nash equilibrium \s in the lower bound construction of Theorem 3.1 for general weighted congestion games.
1. It is a strongly dominant strategy for any player i = 1, . . . , \mu to play \s i . 2. For any i = \mu + 1, . . . , n + \mu , given that every player k < i has chosen to play \s k , then it is a strongly dominant strategy for player i to deviate to \s i as well. For the first condition, fix some player i \leq \mu and a strategy profile s - i for the other players, and observe that by choosing \s i , player i incurs a cost of at most
, where in the first inequality we used the bound from (3.5).
For the second condition, we will consider the deviations of the remaining players. Fix now some i = \mu + 1, . . . , n, and assume a strategy profile s - i = (\s 1 , . . . , \s i - 1 , s i+1 , . . . , s n+\mu ) for the remaining players. 3 If player i chooses strategy s \ast i , she will experience a cost of
The format of profile s \prime - i described in Claim 3.3 and returned as output from Procedure Dominate(s - i , i) (see Appendix A.3). All players i + 1, . . . , i + \mu (i.e., those who lie within the window of interest of player i, depicted in grey) play according to the Nash equilibrium \s, except the last player i + \mu (that plays according to the optimal profile s \ast ) and at most one other k (that may play either \s k or s \ast k ).
The cost C i (\s i , s - i ) is complicated to bound immediately, for any profile s - i . Instead, we will resort to the following claim which characterizes the profile s - i where this cost is maximized, as shown in Figure 3 .3. Its proof can be found in Appendix A.3.
By use of Claim 3.3, it remains to show
just for the special case of profiles s \prime that are described in Claim 3.3 and also shown in Figure 3 .3. We do this in Appendix A.4. Summarizing, we proved that indeed \s is the unique Nash equilibrium of our congestion game. Finally, to conclude with lower-bounding the Price of Stability, let us compute the social cost on profiles \s and s \ast . On s \ast , any facility j (except the last 
3). All players i + 1, . . . , i + \mu (i.e., those who lie within the window of interest of player i, depicted in gray) play according to the Nash equilibrium \s, except the last player i + \mu (that plays according to the optimal profile s \ast ) and at most one other k (that may play either \s k or s \ast k ).
The cost C i (\s i , s - i ) is complicated to bound immediately for any profile s - i . Instead, we will resort to the following claim, which characterizes the profile s - i where this cost is maximized, as shown in Figure 3 which dominates s - i , i.e.,
By use of Claim 3.3, it remains to show that
just for the special case of profiles s \prime that are described in Claim 3.3 and also shown in Figure 3 .3. We do this in Appendix A.4. Summarizing, we proved that indeed \s is the unique Nash equilibrium of our congestion game. Finally, to conclude with lower-bounding the PoS, let us compute the social cost on profiles \s and s \ast . On s \ast , any facility j (except the last one) gets a load equal to the weight of player j, so
On the other hand, at the unique Nash equilibrium \s each facility j \geq \mu + 1 receives a load equal to the sum of the weights of the previous \mu players, i.e.,
By taking n arbitrarily large we get a lower bound on the PoS of
where from Lemma 3.2 we know that 1 3 \leq \beta = 1 2o(1). 3.1.1. Network games. Due to the rather simple structure of the players' strategy sets in the lower bound construction of Theorem 3.1, it can be readily extended to network games as well.
Proposition 3.4. Theorem 3.1 applies also to network weighted congestion games.
Proof. We arrange the resources from the instance in the proof of Theorem 3.1 as edges in a graph as depicted in Figure 3 .4. In particular, for all j = \mu +1, . . . , n+\mu +1, resource j from Theorem 3.1 corresponds to edge (u j , u j+1 ). For the special case of the first \mu resources, for j = 1, . . . , \mu , we represent resource j by the directed edge (u \mu +1 , u j ).
Regarding strategies, recall from the instance used in the proof of Theorem 3.1 that, for each i = \mu , . . . , n, player i has two available strategies: resource \{ i\} and resources \{ i + 1, . . . , i + \mu \} . To map this to our network instance, we set the source 12 CHRISTODOULOU ET AL. node o i of player i to be o i = u i+1 and introduce a new destination node t i connected to the rest of the graph by zero-latency directed edges (u i , t i ) and (u i+\mu +1 , t i ). In that way, strategy \{ i\} of Theorem 3.1 corresponds to the path o i = u i+1 \rightar u i \rightar t i of our graph, while strategy \{ i + 1, . . . , i + \mu \} to path o i = u i+1 \rightar u i+2 \rightar \cdot \cdot \cdot \rightar u i+\mu +1 \rightar t i . To avoid clutter, these destination nodes t i and the corresponding zero-latency edges are not depicted in Figure 3 .4. In an analogous way, we can set the sources and destinations of the remaining first i = 1, . . . , \mu -1 and last i = n+1, . . . , n+\mu +1 players, taking into consideration their specially restricted strategy sets in the construction of the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Summarizing, each player i \in [1, n + \mu ] has to route its traffic from o i to t i , where
and nodes t i are connected with zero latency edges as follows:
\bullet For each i \in [1, n + \mu ] there is a directed zero cost edge from u i to t i . \bullet For each i \in [1, n] there is a directed zero cost edge from u \mu +1+i to t i . \bullet For each i \in [n + 1, n + \mu ] there is a directed zero cost edge from u \mu +n+2 to t i . Then, by construction, each player i has two available o i \rightar t i paths, which correspond directly to strategy sets s \ast i and \s i used in the proof of Theorem 3.1. There is one issue left to complete our network game construction: we have not yet set a direction on some of our edges, namely (u i , u i+1 ) for i = \mu + 1, . . . , n + \mu + 1 which are depicted also as undirected edges in Figure 3 .4. This is due to the fact that, by our construction so far, these edges can be used in both directions: by player i (left-to-right) or player i + 1 (right-to-left). Thus, to turn our instance to a valid directed network, we need to replace such edges with a``gadget"" that essentially forces both players, no matter from which direction they enter the edge, to use it in the same direction and both contribute to its load. This can be achieved by using the structure depicted in the bottom right corner of Figure 3 
Singleton games.
In this section we give an exponential lower bound for singleton weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions. The following theorem handles also approximate equilibria and provides a lower bound on the Price of Stability in a very strong sense; even if one allows for the best approximate equilibrium with approximation factor \alpha = o \bigl( d ln d \bigr)
, then its cost is lower-bounded node o i of player i to be o i = u i+1 and introduce a new destination node t i connected to the rest of the graph by zero-latency directed edges (u i , t i ) and (u i+\mu +1 , t i ). In that way, strategy \{ i\} of Theorem 3.1 corresponds to the path o i = u i+1 \rightar u i \rightar t i of our graph, while strategy \{ i + 1, . . . , i + \mu \} corresponds to path o i = u i+1 \rightar u i+2 \rightar \cdot \cdot \cdot \rightar u i+\mu +1 \rightar t i . To avoid clutter, these destination nodes t i and the corresponding zero-latency edges are not depicted in Figure 3 .4. In an analogous way, we can set the sources and destinations of the remaining first i = 1, . . . , \mu -1 and last i = n + 1, . . . , n + \mu + 1 players, taking into consideration their specially restricted strategy sets in the construction of the proof of Theorem 3.1.
and nodes t i are connected with zero-latency edges as follows:
\bullet For each i \in [1, n + \mu ] there is a directed zero cost edge from u i to t i . \bullet For each i \in [1, n] there is a directed zero cost edge from u \mu +1+i to t i . \bullet For each i \in [n + 1, n + \mu ] there is a directed zero cost edge from u \mu +n+2 to t i . Then, by construction, each player i has two available o i \rightar t i paths, which correspond directly to strategy sets s \ast i and \s i used in the proof of Theorem 3.1. There is one issue left to complete our network game construction: we have not yet set a direction on some of our edges, namely (u i , u i+1 ) for i = \mu + 1, . . . , n + \mu + 1, which are depicted also as undirected edges in Figure 3 .4. This is due to the fact that, by our construction so far, these edges can be used in both directions: by player i (left-to-right) or player i + 1 (right-to-left). Thus, to turn our instance to a valid directed network, we need to replace such edges with a``gadget"" that essentially forces both players, no matter from which direction they enter the edge, to use it in the same direction and both contribute to its load. This can be achieved by using the structure depicted in the bottom right corner of Figure 3 
In this section we give an exponential lower bound for singleton weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions. The following theorem also handles approximate equilibria and provides a lower bound on the PoS in a very strong sense; even if one allows for the best approximate equilibrium with approximation factor \alpha = o \bigl( d ln d \bigr)
, then its cost is lower-bounded by \omega (poly(d)) times the optimal cost. 4 In other words, in order to achieve polynomial (with respect to d) guarantees on the PoS, one has to consider \Omega \bigl( d ln d \bigr) -approximate equilibria--almost linear in d; this shows that our positive result in Corollary 4.5, of the following subsection 4.3, is almost tight. This is furthermore complemented by Theorem D.1, where we show that the socially optimum profile is a (d + 1)-approximate equilibrium (achieving an optimal PoS of 1).
Theorem 3.5. For any positive integer d and any real \alpha \in [1, d) , the \alpha -approximate (mixed) PoS of weighted (singleton) congestion games with polynomial latencies of degree at most d is at least
In particular, for the special case of \alpha = 1, we derive that the PoS of exact equilibria is \Omega (2 d /d).
Proof. Fix a positive integer d and the desired approximation parameter \alpha \in [1, d) . Also, let \gamma \in (\alpha , d) be a parameter arbitrarily close to \alpha . Our instance consists of n players with weights w i = w i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n, where we set
the inequality holding due to the fact that d + 1 > d -\gamma > 0. At the end of our construction we will take n \rightar \infty , so one can think of n as a very large integer. There are n + 1 facilities with latency functions
Any player i has exactly two strategies, s \ast i = \{ i\} and \s i = \{ i + 1\} , i.e., S i = \{ \{ i\} , \{ i + 1\} \} for all i = 1, . . . , n. Let s \ast , \s be the strategy profiles where every player i plays s \ast i , \s i , respectively. These two outcomes, s \ast and \s, are depicted in Figure 3 .5. One should think of s \ast as the socially optimal profile. We will show that \s is the unique \alpha -approximate Nash equilibrium of our game. To ensure this, it suffices to require the following, which corresponds to eliminating all other possible strictly dominated \alpha -approximate equilibria:
1. It is a strictly \alpha -dominant strategy for player 1 to use facility 2, i.e.,
for any profile s. 2. For any i = 2, . . . , n, if every player k < i has chosen facility k + 1, then it is a strictly \alpha -dominant strategy for player i to choose facility i + 1, i.e., \alpha C i (\s 1 , . . . , \s i - 1 , \s i , s i+1 , . . . , s n ) < C i (\s 1 , . . . , \s i - 1 , s i , s i+1 , . . . , s n ) for any strategies (s i , s i+1 , . . . , s n ) \in S i \times \cdot \cdot \cdot \times S n . 4 To see this, just take any upper bound of d+1 c ln(d+1) on \alpha for a constant c > 2. Then, the lower bound in (3.9) becomes \Omega (d c - 1 ). For the first condition, since facility 2 can be used by at most players 1 and 2, and \gamma > \alpha , it is enough to show that \gamma c 2 
Similarly, for the second condition, it suffices to show that \gamma c i+1 (w i + w i+1 ) \leq c i (w i - 1 + w i ) for i = 2, . . . , n -1, and \gamma c n+1 (w n ) \leq c n (w n - 1 + w n ) for the special case of i = n. This is because, facility i + 1 can be used by at most players i and i + 1, while facility i is already being used by player i -1. Indeed, for any i = 2, . . . , n -1 we see that:
The social cost at equilibrium \s is at least the cost of player n at \s, that is,
On the other hand, consider the strategy profile s \ast where every player i chooses facility For the first condition, since facility 2 can be used by at most players 1 and 2, and \gamma > \alpha , it is enough to show that \gamma c 2 
Similarly, for the second condition, it suffices to show that \gamma c i+1 (w i + w i+1 ) \leq c i (w i - 1 + w i ) for i = 2, . . . , n -1, and \gamma c n+1 (w n ) \leq c n (w n - 1 + w n ) for the special case of i = n. This is because facility i + 1 can be used by at most players i and i + 1, while facility i is already being used by player i -1. Indeed, for any i = 2, . . . , n -1 we see that
On the other hand, consider the strategy profile s \ast where every player i chooses facility i:
.
Recall now that, from (3.10), w \gamma > 1, and thus lim n\rightar\infty ( w \gamma ) - n = 0. So, as the number of players n grows large, we get the following lower bound on the PoS:
Since \gamma is chosen arbitrarily close to \alpha , deploying (3.10) to substitute w, the above lower bound can be written as
4. Upper bounds. The negative results of the previous sections involve constructions where the ratio W of the largest to smallest weight can be exponential in d. In the main theorem (Theorem 4.4) of this section we present an analysis which is sensitive to this parameter W , and we identify conditions under which the performance of approximate equilibria can be significantly improved.
Our upper bound approach is based on the design of a suitable approximate potential function and has three main steps. First, in subsection 4.1, we set up a framework for the definition of this function by identifying conditions that, on the one hand, certify the existence of an approximate equilibrium and, on the other, provide guarantees about its efficiency. Then, in subsection 4.2, by use of the Euler--Maclaurin summation formula we present a general form of an approximate potential function, which extends Rosenthal's potential for weighted congestion games (see also Appendix C). Finally, in subsection 4.3, we deploy this potential for polynomial latencies. Due to its analytic description, our potential differs from other extensions of Rosenthal's potential that have appeared in previous work, and we believe that this contribution might be of independent interest and could be applied to other classes of latency functions.
4.1. The potential method. In the next lemma we lay the foundation for the design and analysis of approximate potential functions by supplying conditions that provide guarantees not only for the existence of approximate equilibria but also for their performance with respect to the social optimum. In the premise of the lemma, we give conditions on the resource functions \phi e , having in mind that \Phi (s) = \sum e\in E \phi e (x e (s)) will eventually serve as the``approximate"" potential function.
Lemma 4.1. Consider a weighted congestion game with latency functions c e , for each facility e \in E, and player weights w i , for each player i \in N . If there exist functions \phi e : \BbbR \geq 0 -\rightar \BbbR and parameters \alpha 1 , \alpha 2 , \beta 1 , \beta 2 > 0 such that for any facility e and player weight w \in \{ w 1 , . . . , w n \} then our game has an \alpha 2 \alpha 1 -approximate pure Nash equilibrium which, furthermore, has PoS at most \beta 2 \beta 1 .
Proof. Denote \alpha = \alpha 2 \alpha 1 , \beta = \beta 2 \beta 1 . First we will show that the function \Phi (s) = \sum e\in E \phi e (x e (s)) (defined over all feasible outcomes s) is an \alpha -approximate potential; i.e., for any profile s, any player i, and strategy s \prime i \in S i ,
This would be sufficient to establish the existence of a pure \alpha -approximate equilibrium, since any (local) minimizer of \Phi will do. So, it is enough to prove that
Indeed, if for simplicity we denote x e = x e (s) and x \prime e = x e (s \prime i , s - i ) for all facilities e, 
where the first inequality holds due to (4.1) and the second holds because \alpha 2 \geq \alpha 1 . Next, for the upper bound of \beta on the PoS, it is enough to show that for any profiles s, s \prime , \Phi (s) \leq \Phi (s \prime ) =\Rightar C(s) \leq \beta \cdot C(s \prime ), because, if s \ast \in argmin \bfs C(s) is an optimal-cost profile and \s \in argmin \bfs \Phi (s) is a global minimizer of \Phi , then C(\s) \leq \beta C(s \ast ) (and furthermore, as a minimizer of \Phi , \s is clearly an \alpha -approximate equilibrium as well; see the first part of the current proof). Indeed, denoting x e = x e (s), x \prime e = x e (s \prime ) for simplicity, we have
where for the first inequality we deployed (4.2).
4.2.
Faulhaber's potential. In this section we propose an approximate potential function, which is based on the following classic number-theoretic result, known as Faulhaber's formula, 5 which states that for any positive integers n, m,
where the coefficients B j are the usual Bernoulli numbers. 6 In particular, this shows that the sum of the first n powers with exponent m can be expressed as a polynomial of n with degree m+1. Furthermore, this sum corresponds to the well-known potential of Rosenthal [46] for unweighted congestion games when the latency function is the monomial x \mapsto \rightar x m .
Based on the above observation, we go beyond just integer values of n and generalize this idea to all positive reals; in that way, we design a``potential"" function that can handle different player weights and, furthermore, incorporate in a more powerful, analytically smooth way approximation factors with respect to both the PoS and the approximation parameter of the equilibrium (in the spirit of Lemma 4.1). A natural way to do this is to directly generalize (4.3) and simply define, for any real x \geq 0 and positive integer m,
keeping just the first two significant terms. 7 For the special case of m = 0 we set S 0 (y):=y. for m = 0, in particular, this gives A 0 (x)=1. Observe that A m is strictly increasing (in x) for all m \geq 1, For the special case of m = 0 we simply have A 0 (x) = 1 for all x \geq 0. Figure 4 .1 shows a graph of these functions. Since A m is strictly increasing for m \geq 1, its inverse function, A - 1 m : [2 m+1 m+3 , m + 1) -\rightar [1, \infty ), is well defined and also strictly increasing for all m \geq 1, with (4.7)
A - 1 m (x) = (m + 1)x 2(m + 1x) . 5 See, e.g., [37, p. 287] or [22, p. 106] ). Johann Faulhaber [25] was the first to discover the formula and express it in a systematic way, up to the power of m = 17. Jakob Bernoulli was able to state it in its full generality as his famous Summ{\ae} Potestatum [7, p. 97 ] by introducing what are now known as Bernoulli numbers (see also footnote 6). The first to rigorously prove the formula was Carl Jacobi [36] . 6 See, e.g., [31, Chapter 6.5] \in [1, 2) and going up to d + 1 at the limit. Here, A 0 (1) = 1, A 1 (1) = 1, A 2 (1) = 6/5 = 1.2 and A 40 (1) = 82/43 \approx 1.907.
The following two lemmas (whose proofs can be found in Appendices B.2 and B.3) describe some useful properties regarding the algebraic behaviour, and the relation among, functions A m and S m : 
Observe that, as the approximation parameter \alpha increases, the Price of Stability decreases, in a smooth way, from d+3 2 down to the optimal value of 1. Furthermore, notice how the interval within which \alpha ranges, shrinks as the range of player weights W grows; in particular, its left boundary 2(d+1)W 2W +d+1 goes from 2 d+1 d+3 = 2 -4 d+3 (for W = 1) up to d + 1 (for W \rightar \infty ).
As a result, Theorem 4.4 has two interesting corollaries, one for \alpha = 2(d+1)W 2W +d+1 and one for W = 1 (unweighted games): \in [1, 2) and going up to d + 1 at the limit. Here, A 0 (1) = 1, A 1 (1) = 1, A 2 (1) = 6/5 = 1.2, and A 40 (1) = 82/43 \approx 1.907.
The following two lemmas (whose proofs can be found in Appendices B. Theorem 4.4. At any congestion game with polynomial latency functions of degree at most d \geq 1 and player weights ranging in [1, W ] , for any 2(d+1)W 2W +d+1 \leq \alpha \leq d + 1 there exists an \alpha -approximate pure Nash equilibrium that, furthermore, has PoS at most
Observe that, as the approximation parameter \alpha increases, the PoS decreases, in a smooth way from d+3 2 down to the optimal value of 1. Furthermore, notice how the interval within which \alpha ranges shrinks as the range of player weights W grows; in particular, its left boundary 2(d+1)W 2W +d+1 goes from 2 d+1 d+3 = 2 -4 d+3 (for W = 1) up to d + 1 (for W \rightar \infty ).
As a result, Theorem 4.4 has two interesting corollaries---one for \alpha = 2(d+1)W
2W +d+1
and one for W = 1 (unweighted games).
Corollary 4.5. At any congestion game with polynomial latencies of degree at most d \geq 1 where player weights lie within the range [1, W ] , there is an 2(d+1)W 2W +d+1approximate pure Nash equilibrium with PoS at most d+3 2 . It is interesting to point out here that, in light of Theorem 3.5, the above result of Corollary 4.5 is almost asymptotically tight as far as the PoS is concerned (see the discussion preceding Theorem 3.5).
Corollary 4.6. At any unweighted congestion game with polynomial latencies of degree at most d \geq 1, the PoS of \alpha -approximate equilibria is at most d+1 \alpha for any 2 d+1 d+3 \leq \alpha \leq d + 1.
Before proving Theorem 4.4, we first restate it in the following equivalent form that parametrizes the approximation factor of the equilibrium as well as its PoS guarantee, with respect to an``external,"" seemingly artificial, parameter \gamma \in [1, \infty ) . The equivalence of the two formulations is formally proven in Appendix B.4. The statement of Claim 4.7 may at first seem a bit cryptic compared to Theorem 4.4. Nevertheless, it brings forth some important aspects of our upper bound construction that are not immediately obvious from Theorem 4.4. In particular, notice how the weight range W has no effect on the PoS guarantee in the statement of Claim 4.7 but appears only in the approximation factor of the equilibrium. Furthermore, as will become more clear in subsection 4.4, this formulation provides a good degree of high-level abstraction that helps with generalizing and improving our result in certain cases, in a unified way. We believe this is important, since it is a promising direction for future work (see also the discussion in Appendix C).
Proof of Claim 4.7. Without loss of generality, it is enough to consider only weighted congestion games with monomial latency functions (of degree at most d); any polynomial is a sum of monomials, so we can just simulate the polynomial latency of a facility by introducing monomial-latency facilities for each one of its summands. More formally, if a facility e has latency function c e (x) = \sum d j=0 a e,j x j , with constants a e,0 , a e,1 , . . . , a e,d \geq 0, we can replace e by facilities e 0 , . . . , e d with latencies c ej (x) = a e,j x j , without any change to the costs of the players. Furthermore, we can safely ignore all such facilities e j with a e,j = 0, since they have absolutely no effect on the players' costs.
So, from now on, assume that for each facility e \in E there exist a real constant a e > 0 and an nonnegative integer m e \leq d such that c e (x) = a e x me .
Then, in order to utilize Lemma 4.1, we choose functions where \gamma is a real parameter, free to range in [1, \infty ) . Recall here that functions S m and A m are defined in (4.4) and (4.5). To simplify notation, from now on we fix an arbitrary facility e and drop the e subscripts from \phi e , c e , a e , and m e . 
Similarly, from (4.9) we have that for any x \geq 1,
Now let us just scale the functions \phi e we defined in (4.10) by a factor of 1
Sm(\gamma )
and define a potential function
Our previous bounds for \phi show us that \= \phi satisfies the requirements of Lemma 4.1 with parameters
where the inequalities hold due to Lemma 4.2, taking into consideration the fact that \gamma w \geq \gamma \geq 1 and m \leq d; specifically, for the last inequality on the bound of \alpha 1 , we also used the fact that A d is monotonically increasing.
Putting everything together, from Lemma 4.1 we deduce that indeed there exists an A d (\gamma W )--approximate pure Nash equilibrium with PoS at most d+1 A d (\gamma ) . The fact that A d (\gamma ) ranges (monotonically) in [2 d+1 d+3 , d + 1) is a consequence of (4.6). 4.4. Small versus large degree polynomials. One can argue that our choice to keep only the first two terms in Faulhaber's formula (4.3), when defining our approximate potential in (4.4), is suboptimal. To some extent, this is correct; it is exactly the reason this seemingly``unnatural"" lower bound of 2 d+1 d+3 = 2 -4 d+3 for the approximation parameter \alpha appears in Corollary 4.6 (or, more generally, 2(d+1)W 2W +d+1 in Theorem 4.4). It would be nicer if \alpha could simply start from 1 instead. Indeed, this can be achieved for small values of d, as described below.
Considering the entire right-hand side expression in (4.3), one can take the full, exact version of Faulhaber's formula, which can be written 9 in a very elegant way as are the Bernoulli polynomials, and coefficients B k = B k (0) are the standard Bernoulli numbers we used before. Now we can use (4.11) to define a more fine-tuned version for S m ; that is, for m \geq 1 we set \Ŝ m (x) = 1 m+1 [B m+1 (x + 1) -B m+1 ] instead of (4.4). For example, for degrees up to m \leq 4 these new polynomials are
Using these values, one can verify that for up to m \leq 4, all our critical technical requirements for the proof of \ Sm(x) (with respect to x \geq 1). In particular, now we have that \Â m (1) = 1 m+1 \ Sm(1) = 1, which is exactly what we wanted: this means that the critical quantities \Â d (\gamma W ) and \Â d (\gamma ) in Claim 4.7 can start taking values all the way down to \Â d (W ) and \Â d (1) = 1, respectively. This translates to the approximation ratio parameter \alpha in our main result in Theorem 4.4 starting to range from \alpha \geq \Â d (W ).
Thus, Theorem 4.4 can be rewritten for d \leq 4, with the approximation parameter \alpha taking values in \Â d (W ) \leq \alpha \leq d + 1. In particular, for unweighted games, this means that Corollary 4.6 can be rewritten with \alpha taking values within the entire range of [1, d + 1]. However, there is a catch which does not allow us to do that in general; as m grows large, the Bernoulli polynomials, which now play a critical role in our definition of functions \Ŝ m (see (4.11)), start to behave in a rather erratic, nonsmooth way within the interior of the real intervals between consecutive integer values. For example, one can check that, for d = 14, function \Â 14 is not monotonically increasing within [1, 2] . Even more disastrously, for d = 20, 21, functions \Ŝ d take negative values in [1, 2] Proof. From Mitrinovi\' c [42, eq. (3), p. 267] we know that the following inequality holds for all n \geq 1 and 1 \leq x \leq n:
Applying it with n = d and x = ln d, we get that indeed
the last inequality holding due to the fact that for d \geq 9, ln 2 d d + 1 ln d \leq ln 2 (9) 9 + 1 ln(9) \approx 0.992 \leq 1.
Lemma A.2. For any integer d \geq 2, the function f : (0, \infty ) 2 -\rightar (0, \infty ) defined by
is monotonically decreasing with respect to y. Furthermore, for d \geq 9,
where \beta d is defined in Lemma 3.2.
Proof. First, let us define function h : (0, \infty ) -\rightar (0, \infty ) with
We will show that h is increasing, which will suffice to prove the desired monotonicity of f since its derivative is
which is negative due to the monotonicity of h. To prove that h is indeed increasing, we will show something stronger---namely that function \= h : (1, \infty ) -\rightar (0, \infty ) with
is increasing. This will suffice to demonstrate that h is increasing as well, since h(t) = (t + 1) \cdot \= h(t + 1). Taking its derivative, we see that
> 0 since from the convexity of function t \mapsto \rightar t d we know that t d -(t -1) d < dt d - 1 . Now let us prove the remaining part of our lemma, that is, (A.1). Observe that if we set \zeta = 1 to (A.1), it is satisfied, since f (0, y) = 1 for any y > 0. So, it is enough if we prove that
is increasing with respect to \zeta \in [1, 2] , where here we are using \beta = \beta d and \alpha = \beta \Phi d . So, if we define
In particular, for any integer d,
with \gamma d := ln d \scrW (d) \leq 1.368 and lim
where \scrW (\cdot ) denotes the (principal branch of the) Lambert-W function. 10 Proof. To show (A.5), first one can simply numerically verify that it indeed holds for all integers d = 9, 10, . . . , 17, so let us just focus on the case when d \geq 18. For simplicity, in the remainder of the proof we denote y = \Phi d . It is easy to see 11 then that y \geq \Phi 18 \approx 8.11 > 8.
Performing some elementary algebraic manipulations in (A.5), we can equivalently write it as
Using the fact that (y + 1) d - 1 = y d+1 y+1 , and then that y d+1 \geq (y -1) d+1 , we can see that it is enough to show that
or, equivalently,
For the last inequality we took into consideration that y d < 1. As a matter of fact, using an upper bound of y \leq 2d ln d on y = \Phi d (see [3, Lemma 5.4] or (A.7)), we have that y d \leq 2 ln d \leq 2 ln (18) \approx 0.692.
Due to the fact that function z \mapsto \rightar 1 1 - z is increasing for z \in [0, 1), this bound gives us that 1 1 -y d \leq 1 1 - 0.69 \leq 3.226. In a similar way, noticing that function z \mapsto \rightar (z+1)(z - 2) 2z is increasing for z > 2, using the fact that y > 8, we can derive that (y+1)(y - 2) 2y > (8+1)(8 - 2) 2\cdot 8 = 27 8 \approx 3.375. This establishes the validity of (A.8). Next, we deal with upper-bounding the values of \Phi d and proving (A.7), since we will need this for establishing the asymptotics of \Phi d in (A.6). Here we will make use of the following property, which was shown in Aland et al. [ 
where for the second to last equality we used the power series representation of the exponential function: e z = \sum \infty k=0 z k k! . Thus, from (A.9) we can derive that, for any \gamma > 0,
Using \gamma d = ln d \scrW (d) as defined in the statement of our lemma, we compute
Thus, since from the definition of function \scrW we know that 
where for the last equality we used the fact that
which is a direct consequence of the definition of \Phi d :
which holds by the very definition of c in (3.1) if we relax the floor operator.
Let us now move to (3.4) and in particular lower-bound the values of parameter \beta as d grows large. Due to the floor operator in (3.1), parameter c can be lower-bounded by
and since \beta is increasing with respect to c,
Taking limits and recalling that lim d\rightar\infty \Phi d = \infty , we get the desired lower bound of lim d\rightar\infty \beta \geq 1 -
The upper bound of \beta \leq 1 2 can be easily derived by (A.12):
For small values of d, and in particular in order to prove that \beta \geq 0.38, one can numerically compute the values for \beta directly from (3.1). For example, for d = 9, . . . , 100, these values are shown in Figure 3 .1. The lower and upper red lines in Figure 3 .1 correspond to the relaxation of the floor operator we used in the lower and upper bounds for \beta in (A.13) and (A.12), respectively. The actual values of \beta lie between these two lines. Using these values and the resulting monotonicity for \beta , one can also prove the lower bound of 3 for dc by observing that, by setting d = 9 in (3.1), we have that for any d \geq 9
d \cdot c \geq \biggl\l 9 ln(2 \cdot \Phi 9 + 1)ln(\Phi 9 + 1) ln(\Phi 9 ) \biggr\r \approx \lfloor 3.368\rfloor = 3, since \Phi 9 \approx 5.064.
A.3. Proof of Claim 3.3. Since we have fixed that s j = \s j for all players j < i and also the strategies of players j > i + \mu have no effect on the cost of player i (and in particular in (3)), it is safe to briefly abuse notation and for now assume that s - i = (s i+1 , . . . , s i+\mu ).
We generate the desired dominating profile s \prime - i inductively by running Procedure Dominate(s - i , i), described formally below, scanning and modifying profile s - i from right to left. First, it is not difficult to see that the output profile s \prime - i of Dominate(s - i , i) indeed has the desired format described in Items 1 to 3 of Claim 3.3. In particular, after any execution of the while-loop in lines 4--6 of Procedure Dominate, s \prime j = \s j for any j = k + 1, . . . , i + \mu -1. Furthermore, it is also easy to see that switching player's i + \mu strategy to s \prime i+\mu = s \ast i+\mu can only increase player's i cost, i.e., (3.7) is satisfied after line 2 of Dominate: if player i+\mu chooses \s i+\mu instead, she contributes nothing to the cost of player i, since she does not put her weight in any of the facilities i + 1, . . . , i + \mu played by player i.
So, it remains to be shown that after every iteration of the while-loop, condition (3.7) is maintained. Since in any such loop only the strategy of player k is possibly switched from s \ast k to \s k , it is enough if we show that C i (\s k , s \prime - k ) \geq C i (s \ast k , s \prime - k ) or, since for any facility j < k it holds that x j (\s k , s \prime - k ) = x j (s \ast k , s \prime - k ), equivalently i+\mu \sum j=k c j (x j (\s k , s \prime - k )) \geq i+\mu \sum j=k c j (x j (s \ast k , s \prime - k )).
If we let z j , for any j \geq k, denote the load on facility j induced by every player except from player k, that is, formally, z j = \sum \{ w \ell | \ell \in \{ j -\mu , . . . , j\} \setminu \{ k\} \wedge j \in s \prime \ell \} , then the above can be written as
Thus, it is sufficient to only take j = i + \mu in the above sum and just prove that
where the first inequality holds due to the fact that from the while-loop test in line 4 of Procedure Dominate we know that A \not = \emptyse and the last one holds because of 1 -\beta = w - \mu , we finally get that it is enough if we show that
, since \zeta \geq w 1 \geq 1 and \zeta \leq w \mu - 2 \leq w \mu = (1 -\beta ) - 1 . But this is satisfied, due to (A.1) of Lemma A.2, since we have selected our parameters c = c d and \beta = \beta d as in Lemma 3.2.
A.4. Proof of (3.8) . In any such profile, player i+\mu plays s \ast i+\mu and the following hold:
\bullet Either all other players j = i + 1, . . . , i + \mu -1 play \s j , in which case
the last equality holding due to the definition of \alpha , \bullet or there exists a single player k \in \{ i + 1, . . . , i + \mu -1\} that plays s \ast k (instead of \s k , which corresponds exactly to the previous case), in which case
which is decreasing with respect to k, so taking the smallest possible value k = i + 1 we have that
which holds due to (3.3) since we have already selected parameter c = c d as in (3.1). 
Proof. Expanding the powers, our inequality can be rewritten equivalently as which is increasing with respect to m. For the remaining sequence, observe that for any integer m \geq 0 and reals y \geq x \geq 1,
so it is enough to show that function Am+1(x) Am(x) is monotonically increasing with respect to x \geq 0. Indeed, A m+1 (x) A m (x) = which holds, as an immediate consequence of the monotonicity of function A m (see (4.6)), given that \gamma x \geq \gamma \geq 1. For (4.8), it is enough to prove just the special case when w = 1, i.e., (B.1) \gamma m+1 A m (\gamma ) = S m (\gamma ) \leq S m (\gamma x + \gamma ) -S m (\gamma x) (x + 1) m \leq \gamma m+1 , since then it is not difficult to check that we can recover the more general case in (4.8) by simply substituting \gamma := \gamma w and x := x w into (B.1). It is not difficult to check that (B.1) holds for m = 0, recalling that S 0 (x) = x for all x \geq 0. Next, assume for the remainder of the proof that m \geq 1.
For the left-hand inequality of (B.1) first, it can be equivalently rewritten as x m \biggr] .
Since \gamma \geq 1, we know that 1 2\gamma \in [0, 1 2 ]. Thus, taking into consideration that (x+1) m > x m \geq 0, the linear combination on the right-hand side of the above inequality is minimized for where \zeta (m) = \sum \infty j=1 1 j m is Riemann's zeta function. Thus, if function f is such that the quantity in the right-hand side of (C.2) eventually vanishes, i.e., for any real x \geq 0, But since for the integer value x = 1 we know that S(1) = \sum 1 j=0 f (j) = 1 + e, it must be that So, we finally have that S(x) = (e x -1) 1 e -1 + e x = e x+1 -1 e -1 .
From this, for all reals x \geq 0, w > 0 we compute (C.5) S(x + w) -S(x) wf (x + w) = 1 e -1 e x+w+1e x+1 we x+w = e e -1
1e - w w , which does not depend on x. Thus, from (4.1) in Lemma 4.1 we deduce that exact pure Nash equilibria always exist for weighted congestion games with exponential the first inequality in (D.1). To see the second inequality, observe that \bigl( j+1 k \bigr) \bigl( j k \bigr) = j + 1 j + 1k \leq j + 1 \leq d + 1.
Since s \ast minimizes social cost, for all players i \in [n] and strategies s i \in S i , C(s \ast ) \leq C(s i , s \ast - i ).
Denoting y e = \sum 
